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have either a doctrine of religious intuition or else the ontological argument. On the whole, however, it is tolerably clear that Ladd's position is that religion is a real experience, a part of the commerce of men with their world, and that the validity of religious beliefs proves itself precisely through the vital, creative place that they occupy in advancing life, individual and racial.

GEORGE A. COE.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY.

La philosophie pratique de Kant. Par VICTOR DELBOS. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1906. — pp. 756.

I have toiled through this extensive and scholarly work with the painful consciousness that the task of reviewing it should be undertaken by a Kantian specialist, and not by one who is more interested in the definitive results and general validity of Kant's practical philosophy than in the minutiae of its formation. M. Delbos, however, very clearly indicates the character of his work in the Preface, where he maintains that a knowledge of the successive steps in the development of Kant's philosophy must be an essential factor in its interpretation, and that it would often present a better appearance in the eyes of adversaries if the knowledge of its genesis were allowed to preserve it from the over-simplified schematic expression in which many of its partisans have encased it. If M. Delbos has not wholly escaped the danger of losing the wood in the trees, it should be sufficient to remind the reader of the nature of the author's undertaking.

He has not sought to write an introduction to Kant after the manner of Paulsen, nor a critical examination of the Kantian philosophy like Caird. There is indeed but little criticism in the book, and some of the chapters consist almost entirely of an objective restatement of Kant's argument. This is the case, *e. g.*, with the long chapter (ninety pages) on the *Critique of Judgment*. The latter half of this chapter deals with the Teleological Judgment; but there is no discussion of Kant's doctrine of Finality such as we find, *e. g.*, in Caird or in Janet's *Final Causes*. Sixty of the ninety pages devoted to *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason* are occupied with an abridgment of the contents of that treatise, and about the same proportions of exposition and commentary may be found in other chapters. Few people, undoubtedly, wish to read all of Kant's published writings. For the less significant of them an abridgment is probably sufficient. But to the present writer it does not seem that for works like the *Kr. d. U.* and *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* such a full restatement as M. Delbos gives is either an adequate

substitute for the reading of the full text or essential to the description of the psychological genesis of the Kantian philosophy. In short, I do not suppose that M. Delbos intends his book as a substitute for Kant; and if not, he could have reduced its compass one third by curtailing his expositions and simply giving us the references. However that may be, the author's primary object is to expound and analyze in their chronological order all the works of Kant in so far as they relate to the development of his practical philosophy (Preface). For this purpose he has utilized not only Kant's minor as well as his major works, but the constantly increasing mass of Kantiana in the form of correspondence, lecture-notes, philosophical remains, etc., together with the most important treatises of every sort which deal in any way with the Königsberg philosopher. The work thus becomes a thesaurus of Kantian material, the usefulness of which is, however, considerably impaired by the lack of an index or even an adequate table of contents. This defect, so common in French books, is all the more inexcusable in view of the fact that the exposition is chronological rather than logical or topical, and the reader has no clue whatever to the whereabouts of any particular word or doctrine that he may desire to look into. Some amends is however made by the addition of numerous cross-references, which, besides revealing the author's scholarly acquaintance with Kant, help the reader to find and compare different passages, and thus to form his own opinion of Kant's essential meaning.

In the first two chapters of the Introduction M. Delbos gives a sketch, first, of the two great eighteenth century forces which combined to form Kant's character and develop his genius, viz., Pietism and Rationalism; secondly, of Kant's moral and intellectual personality. The essential theme of his moral speculations and the essential trait of his personality are found in the union of freedom and law. The object of the third chapter is to answer the question how Kant arrived at his philosophy, especially the practical part of it. The architectonic idea is not a gift, but a gradual acquisition. Kant first directed his studies to the different objects of philosophy; they later took a definite form, and led him gradually to the idea of a whole. He is the 'philosopher of antinomies.' We have Kant's own statement (in a letter to Garve) that his starting point was not discussion about the existence of God and Immortality; it was the antinomies which first awakened him from his dogmatic slumbers. A stronger case can undoubtedly be made for the view that the whole course of Kant's thinking was determined by his desire to conserve morality and re-

ligion, than for the view that his moral theology was an afterthought, created only to counteract the ruinous consequences of the *Kr. d. r. V.* Kant tells us that the origin of the Critical Philosophy is morality in respect to the imputability of actions; and again, that the doctrine of the ideality of space and time and the doctrine of freedom are the two pivots of his system, and that the former depends upon the latter. Nevertheless, M. Delbos thinks it worth while to defend Kant against misconception, perhaps even against himself. Thus, *e. g.*, Kant has certainly inverted the order of dependence of his two fundamental conceptions: Historically the theory of the ideality of space and time was established, by considerations derived from geometry and natural philosophy, before the theory of freedom, and was the necessary condition, not the consequence, of the latter. The conclusion would appear to be that Kant did not develop his system in the interest of faith, but that he wished to found his practical philosophy only in accordance with his theoretical philosophy. M. Delbos believes that an account of the development of Kant's moral ideas in the pre-critical period will make this plain.

Kant's writings prior to 1760 do not reveal any methodical pre-occupation with moral problems. He still adheres to the optimism of Leibnitz; he has not yet made any independent effort to subject the moral conceptions that he had received from the Leibnitzo-Wolffian School to rational criticism. In the *Nova dilucidatio* he is brought in contact with the problem of freedom in connection with the principle of the 'determinant reason,' but he still maintains the Leibnitzian position against Crusius. There is also an anticipation of the later doctrine that the only true good is the good will (Pt. I, ch. 1, pp. 73-90.)

Chapter II deals with the elements of Kant's practical philosophy from 1760 to 1770. In this period we find various anticipations of his later critical doctrine: *e. g.* (in the *Attempt to Introduce the Notion of Negative Quantity into Philosophy*, 1763), that the moral worth of conduct depends upon the virtuous intention of the agent (pp. 96-97), and the distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives, first made in the treatise *On the Evidence of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals*, 1764.

These are points of detail. More important is the evidence afforded by the latter work of the influence of the British moralists, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, to whom Kant owes the doctrine that the good is revealed to us by sentiment and not by cognition (p. 101), — a doctrine worked out more fully, after the English manner of

psychological analysis, in the *Observations on the Sentiment of the Beautiful and Sublime*, 1764.

The transformation of Kant's views on moral problems during this period is due to three principal causes: The critical revision of his metaphysical concepts, the influence of British moral philosophy which found the true source of morality in feeling, and the influence of Rousseau. The account of Kant's indebtedness to Rousseau is particularly good. But if the significance of Rousseau's influence upon Kant has sometimes been insufficiently emphasized,—as, *e. g.*, by Caird,—M. Delbos's patriotism perhaps leads him to do rather more than justice to this influence at the expense of the British moralists. Thus when he says (pp. 115–116) that Kant's famous expression about his awakening from dogmatic slumber is perhaps more applicable to Rousseau than to Hume, he surely goes beyond the mark. The period now under consideration shows a reaction from the moral conceptions of the Leibnitzo-Wolffian School and a temporary adherence to the moral sentiment standpoint under the combined influence of Rousseau and the British moralists; but we have to remember that Kant's awakening 'gave a new direction to his investigations in the field of speculative philosophy.' Whether we follow Benno Erdmann in holding that at this period Kant saw in Hume only the moral essayist and social philosopher and in dating the interruption of his dogmatic slumbers from 1772–1774, or whether we follow Höffding in assigning this awakening to 1762–1763, in either case it was surely Rousseau who, comparable to Newton though he was, remained for Kant the 'philosopher of human society,' while it was Hume who aroused the reflections which resulted in the Critical Philosophy. If any importance is to be attached to Kant's statement, quoted above, in regard to the antinomies, this statement can be reconciled with his expression in regard to Hume, but it would require more ingenuity to harmonize it with M. Delbos's claim in behalf of Rousseau.

If, however, it is fair to comment at all upon an *obiter dictum*, this should be taken in connection with what is said in Chapter III of Part II. The object of this chapter is to show that the philosophy of history was of extreme importance in the constitution of Kant's practical philosophy. But while M. Delbos follows Höffding in laying great stress upon the significance of the period between the *Kritik* and the *Grundlegung*, and upon the influence of Kant's anthropological studies in determining his ethical doctrine, he seems to me to take a less exaggerated and saner view than Höffding of the influence of Rousseau and of the development of Kant's thought at this period.

He avoids the temptation to read modern socio-psychological conceptions into the genesis of Kant's practical philosophy; and he points out that while we may accept 1784 as the date of the *Lectures on Anthropology* edited by Starke, there is an unedited manuscript of these *Lectures* dating from 1775-1776, in which Kant, under the avowed influence of Rousseau, gives expression to ideas similar to those of the historical essays of 1784-1786. (Note, pp. 128-9.) If we should be justified, in accordance with this hint, in pushing back Rousseau's 'second' influence upon Kant from the middle of the eighties to the middle of the seventies, this would weaken the claim that Kant's ethics took definitive shape under the influence of Rousseau in connection with the preparation of the historical essays of 1784-1786, while on the other hand it would add to the plausibility of the statement that Rousseau had more to do with Kant's awakening than Hume. M. Delbos, however, so far as I recall, does not tell in what Kant's real awakening consisted, nor at what date we are to place this significant influence of Rousseau.

Chapter III of Pt. I covers the dark ages of Kant's development, between the *Dissertation* of 1770 and the appearance of the *Kritik*. M. Delbos's principal source for this period is the *Lectures on Metaphysics* (published by Pölitiz in 1821), the delivery of which he follows Heinze in placing between 1775-1776 and 1779-1780. The résumé of these *Lectures* emphasizes Kant's dualism of the transcendental and the practical, the metaphysical concepts of God, freedom, and immortality being here treated by Kant from this double point of view. M. Delbos does not here make use of the *Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthropologie* (as Higler did) because he holds that this must be dated from 1784-1785.

When we come to Part II, "La constitution de la philosophie pratique de Kant," it is a pleasure to find that M. Delbos has some other clue to offer for the exposition of Kant's thought than that of mere chronological sequence. If we accept Kant's statement that the concept of freedom is the keystone of his whole system, the best way of orienting oneself in his practical philosophy is to study how he has defined and justified this concept (p. 191). Chapters I, II, and III of Part II, accordingly, deal with the *Kr. d. r. V.*, the *Prolegomena*, and the works on philosophy of history, with special reference to the development of Kant's idea of freedom. When it is said that Kant's idea of freedom is obscure and contradictory, it is sometimes forgotten that his different accounts of freedom express different points of view and different moments in his development. What is the

notion of freedom essential to the *Kr. d. r. V.*? Is it cosmological freedom conceived as idea of reason and independent of experience? Or is it practical freedom known directly by experience? To which of those two kinds of freedom is the freedom of the autonomous will to be related? And what relation has the intelligible freedom of the treatise *Die Religion* on the one hand with the autonomous will, and on the other hand with the intelligible freedom of the *Kr. d. r. V.*? How does it happen that in the latter freedom is first deduced as a principle and then admitted by postulate (p. 192)?

These are some of the questions that emerge and that M. Delbos is not here concerned to answer, his object being rather to show that the concept of freedom has not yet reached its full significance or its definitive form. Thus, *e. g.*, the concept of the autonomous will does not appear in the first edition of the *Critique* (p. 207), which also leaves ill-defined the relation of freedom as cause to the imperative as law (p. 269), and the way in which the moral law imposes obligation is insufficiently defined (p. 233). Kant's lack of decision in regard to the moral law results in a lack of harmony between the ethical doctrine of the methodology and that of the dialectic (pp. 234 ff.). The *Prolegomena* does not add anything essentially new on moral and religious problems, though it indicates the direction in which Kant's thought was moving. He does not yet seem to have determined the relation of the ideas that must constitute the system of morality, or clearly to have got hold of its organizing conception (pp. 248-256). The will is for Kant the faculty of ends; but it is in the studies on the philosophy of history (1784-1786) that he first definitely relates this conception of an order of ends to the idea of freedom (pp. 264 ff.).

I have not space to take up the remaining chapters which deal with the definitive form of Kant's moral and religious philosophy, but I have perhaps said enough to indicate the scope and general character of the work. The *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion* (1783-1784), show us that Kant now has the idea of moral law, the idea of freedom, and the idea of a universal system of ends; it remains then to define their mutual relations according to some central organizing principle. How M. Delbos understands Kant to have worked out this problem I must leave to the reader to discover. My own opinion is that M. Delbos's analytical presentation of the external influences and internal changes through which Kant gradually reached the definitive form of his practical philosophy is clearer and better than his exposition of the mutual relation of the leading ideas which constitute that philosophy; but his conscientious attempt to

get at Kant's real meaning and his defense of Kant against certain popular misconceptions, add materially to the interest and the value of an able and scholarly work. M. Delbos maintains throughout a judicial tone which leaves nothing to be desired. He writes as a sympathetic interpreter of Kant, but in no partisan spirit. In the last chapter he sums up what he regards as the principal theses of the Kantian ethics, and concludes that Kantianism, when freely interpreted and purified from the imperfections which are largely due to a too rigid and formalistic method, is not opposed to the constitution of a positive science of morals except in so far as the latter pretends to furnish the supreme law of the determination of the will. A metaphysic of morals is however necessary; and Kant has given us one, which, when liberally and not too literally interpreted, is still valuable for contemporary thought, though it cannot now be superstitiously resuscitated under the form that Kant has given it.

GEORGE S. PATTON.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

Geschichte der strafrechtlichen Zurechnungslehre. Von RICHARD LOENING. Erster Band: Die Zurechnungslehre des Aristoteles. Jena, Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1903. — pp. xvi, 357.

The fundamental principles of criminal procedure and the theory of legal responsibility have never been either adequately examined or formulated. This neglect of the scrutiny of general principles on the part of European jurisconsults applies especially to the psychological side of criminal law, and that, too, in spite of the vast accumulation of criminological literature in the last decades. Owing to the prevalent confusion as to the psychological significance of crime, Professor Loening has undertaken to write the history of the doctrine of legal responsibility. In tracing the sources of contemporary theory and practice on this subject, he concluded that the real origin was not to be found in the positive law, but was discoverable further back in the evolution of ethical ideas. Pufendorf was the first writer to employ the term *imputatio* in its technical legal sense and to formulate in a system the subjective presuppositions of legal accountability. The whole body of modern doctrine on the subject of guilt and responsibility goes back to Pufendorf. At twenty-eight years of age (1660) he published his *Elementa jurisprudentiæ universalis* and it is not supposable that he originated his theories *de novo*. His ideas were not derived from the positive law of his time or from the Roman law, but rather from the moral philosophy of the seventeenth century, which went directly